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What is Tank Country? 
William Murphy 
T here are certain principles that evolved during the past war that should be applicable 
to future operations, and one of these principles, 
it is suggested, is the answer to the question of 
what is and what is not tank country. Many 
serving and former members of the Royal 
Canadian Armoured Corps will recollect how 
eagerly they perused reports from the western 
desert during the years they sat in England 
awaiting their turn. They realized that in all 
probability when they saw action it would be with 
a better vehicle and in totally different country. 
But the only reports available, so far as tanks 
were concerned dealt with their use in the desert. 
Such country permitted commanders to exploit 
the mobility of this particular weapon to the full, 
and it played a great, if not predominant, part in 
every victory won, no matter by which side. In 
very rocky country, or where the going was too 
soft, tanks could not operate, but there was 
always plenty of other portions of the front where 
the going was good. Thus the question of what 
was, or what was not, tank country did not receive 
the early consideration that it otherwise might 
have. 
When Canadian tanks landed in Sicily it was 
soon realized that this mountainous country 
called for far different tactics, so far as tanks 
were concerned, than did a wide open country 
such as the desert. In almost every case the 
infantry were the predominant arm and the tank's 
job was to support them to the best of its ability. 
Both arms had much to learn in actual warfare 
in difficult country, and it was hardly surprising 
that infantry thought tanks should do more than 
they were prepared to do, and the tanks thought 
infantry were hopelessly ignorant of the tank's 
capabilities. To begin with, neither really 
appreciated what a tank could or could not do 
to give the infantry a helping hand in the varied 
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country that was fought over. Nor did either 
realize the tremendous help that infantry could 
afford tanks in close going. Italy, with its 
mountains, valleys, olive groves, vineyards, 
crops, walled cemeteries, and other detestable 
features (that is, from a tank point of view) further 
complicated relations between the two arms. 
After all, the infantry wore cloth jackets, and the 
tankmen had several inches of steel to protect, 
them, so why should not the tanks fight where 
the infantry had to go? But at first the tank men 
were reluctant. Their steel was not much good 
against the well-concealed antitank gun or the 
boldly handled infantry anti-tank weapon. In 
close country they could not see them and 
therefore could not protect themselves. The 
gunner's telescope was masked by olive groves 
and vines, and he was unable to give effective 
support to the infantry in any event. So the inter-
service battle raged, and at times there was 
considerable feeling between the two arms. But 
experience was bearing fruit. The tank men, who 
had been taught that tank country was that 
country which afforded the best going, and 
contained successive features permitting good 
fields of fire from hulldown positions, and 
support, tank by tank or troop by troop, began 
to learn that it was just such country that was 
the best protected by anti-tank weapons. 
Few forces can have sufficient tank stoppers 
to be strong in them at all points. The anti-tank 
weapons were usually concentrated to cover the 
best tank approaches. The tank men started to 
experiment. They found they could climb slopes 
they thought were impossible. It was just a matter 
of skillful driving. They found that much rocky 
ground could be traversed with care and 
attention. They found that even terraced hills 
could be topped by driving the terraces until a 
low point was found and then charging a path to 
the next terrace, and so on. Sunken roads and 
other obstacles could be overcome by the use of 
explosives, so they took along tank sappers, 
trained in demolition and mine clearance, and 
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carried them in cut-down Honeys moving with 
squadrons. They used the tank dozer well 
forward to help clear the way where necessary. 
Time and again they found these tactics won 
them that pearl beyond price - surprise - and 
soon they were looking not for good going, but 
the going where only skill and experience could 
get them through. 
The policy was laid down, at least in the 
writer's formation, that every request of the 
infantry must be met if it was humanly possible 
to get the tanks over the ground. The response 
of the infantry was immediate. As soon as they 
found the tanks were ready to take on almost 
anything, their confidence in the tank men firmed, 
and the two started to work together in a most 
satisfactory manner. In not one single instance 
did the writer find that infantry, once assured of 
the tank mens' real desire to help, took unfair 
advantage of that cooperation. It was soon 
realized by all concerned that each arm had its 
own particular tactics. Iftanks stopped to bring 
fire to bear on a position, the infantry quickly 
learned that they were not quitters, but that this 
was the very moment for them to press on under 
cover of that fire. They soon got to know that 
regardless of how close the country, the tanks 
were right behind them, depending on them to 
winkle the concealed antitank weapons, and 
ready to forge ahead when more open country 
was reached. The infantry normally preferred 
country which gave them the maximum in 
covered lines of approach, although often this was 
not the direction of attack the tank men would 
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have chosen. But when the tanks had learned 
that they could depend on the infantry, and so 
long as they could get their vehicles forward. they 
cheerfully accepted the infantry's choice of 
ground. Infantry and tank cooperation reached 
a high peak of efficiency, and the results were 
very gratifying- at least to our side. Even in the 
Apennines, where the tanks were wholly road-
bound, they were found more than useful. They 
formed a firm base from which the infantry could 
fan out into the hills. They brought accurate direct 
and indirect fire to bear when it was most needed. 
And it gave the infantry a comfortable feeling to 
have them around. Infantry like to have tanks 
near them. Possibly the tank is blind in close 
country and therefore helpless, or road-bound, 
or blacked out on a dark night, or otherwise not 
much of an asset. Nevertheless. the infantry like 
to have them around. There is a psychological 
factor here which is most important and should 
never be overlooked. The old practice of "rear 
rally" for reorganization, petrol, rations, etc., was 
discontinued in Italy by the Writer's formation. 
The tanks stayed with the infantry and supplies 
were taken forward to them. Even if they couldn't 
see to fire they could lay their guns on fixed lines, 
and the starting up of tank engines, and the sound 
of their guns at night, were found to have a most 
satisfactory effect both on our own and the enemy 
troops. The close and intimate training of tanks 
and infantry is essential if the best results are to 
be obtained. Where the tanks are to fight with 
well-trained infantry who know and trust them, 
then we have no difficulty in answering the 
question which forms the title of this article. 
Under such circumstances there is only one type 
of country that is non-tank country, namely, that 
terrain over which it is physically impossible to 
move the tanks even with the use of explosives, 
tank dozers or any other artificial aids that are 
available or can be improvised. 
Brigadier William Murphy, CBE, DSO, 
commanded the lst Canadian Armoured 
Brigade in Italy and Northwest Europe until 
the cessation of hostilities. He remained 
involved with the Armoured Corps following 
the end of the war. 
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